Are you overpaying for picks?
What recent trades tell us about dynasty pick valuation
As professional sports teams move further into the analytics era, the average fan has become increasingly invested in draft-pick horse trading. Much of this is spillover from NBA discourse, where the amount of picks being swapped—and the protective conditions attached to them—is the subject of rabid fascination. Yet as more and more fans get into dynasty football, the art of draft-pick valuation moves becomes a decidedly practical concern.
The goal of today’s article, then, is to try and figure out where potential inefficiencies lie in the draft-pick market. This is partially inspired by the real NFL, where forward-thinking teams have developed their own in-house trade charts, in order to outmaneuver other teams still using the Jimmy Johnson chart. The Johnson chart’s a good analog for the website KeepTradeCut (KTC), too, since both are the gold standards for asset comparison in their respective areas.
We aren’t using KTC data today, however; instead, we’re pulling from the FantasyCalc database, which uses slightly different formulas. Compared to KTC, FantasyCalc greatly devalues future picks, partially because it’s agnostic as to where they’ll end up. KTC, by comparison, requires you guesstimate whether a pick will land early or late in its respective round, which is an obviously imprecise science.
The biggest bargains
Let’s dive right in, then, and examine which draft picks are being consistently undervalued by dynasty managers (at least per FantasyCalc’s logic). To keep the scope relatively simple, we’re only using data from one-for-one or two-for-one trades. We also isolate each pick so that it’s the only asset on its side of the trade; that is to say, it’s always the “one” in a “two-for-one” scenario.
This leaves us with mostly third-rounders—and some seconds—being undervalued by FantasyCalc’s logic. (Note: I couldn’t pull fourth-rounders.) In fact, when managers sell off current-year thirds, they only “win” the trade a quarter of the time. The story for early second-rounders is slightly better, with roughly a third of them recouping positive value. The data still suggests, however, that sellers are being underpaid.
We now turn to the median value—per FantasyCalc—that managers are losing by trading away these assets. These numbers don’t map perfectly to KTC value differences, due to various discrepancies between their formula and FantasyCalc’s. Still, I think they capture the idea that people are consistently losing value by trading away early seconds and late thirds.
Granted, many nominal underpays for third-rounders are actually fair per KTC, and depth often is more valuable for contending teams than picks. That said, I’d likely prefer a late third—or whatever assets somebody desperate might offer to acquire it—over hoping last year’s rookies (e.g., Roman Wilson, Ben Sinnott) might still deliver.
The biggest overpays
The real juice, however, lies in the overpays. Many of the picks people overpay for are, unsurprisingly, current-year first-rounders. This is noteworthy because, as we’ve established, the FantasyCalc algorithm already values current-year picks quite highly.
What this means, then, is that even considering how FantasyCalc gasses up current-year firsts, people are still drastically overpaying to acquire them. Given how gung-ho dynasty managers can get on draft day, this isn’t totally surprising. There’s a fitting parallel, really, to the worst impulses of real NFL teams here, whose convictions lead them to trade up into the first round, often with disastrous consequences.
Interestingly, however, the amount by which managers overpay for primo picks is relatively small. The bottom five picks here—in terms of overpay—are within a 100-point margin, which means the median trade involving them is essentially lateral. Tellingly, two of these are late-second-rounders, suggesting that most second-rounders are appropriately priced.
Here’s where the intriguing part comes in: because other players overvalue first-rounders so severely, they might actually be undervalued. That is, of course, if you can acquire them well ahead of the draft, with the intent to then flip them when you’re on the clock. Given the insane offers people make for these picks, staying and picking is rarely worth it; the player would have to be a generational talent, or fill a dire need.
Who fuels underpays?
Above are the assets most commonly involved in underpays for current-year picks. At the top, we have future picks, which isn’t surprising: managers will gladly pay you Tuesday for a hamburger today. Granted, this is a product of FantasyCalc’s formula, which values current-year picks more highly than future ones.
That said, I do think there’s validity in how FantasyCalc devalues future-year picks. To me, the argument isn’t that future picks are inherently inferior to current-year ones. Rather, it’s that if you swapped a late third for a future third straight-up, you’re failing to capitalize on potential overpays for your pick.
This is a big reason why FantasyCalc’s formula frowns upon trading current-year picks for veterans. Instead, you should consider flipping your 2025 picks for a surplus of future picks, then use that excess capital to acquire a vet later on. That way, you’re more likely to nab both a short-term contributor and an extra pick next year.
While this is certainly pie-in-the-sky logic, the players above add credence to the notion that you shouldn’t burn current-year picks on acquiring vets. To be sure, some of them offer real upside, like Jalen Coker and George Pickens. It’s harder to make cases for many of the others, though: Kupp’s likely washed, Darnold’s success could be a fluke, and Tank Dell might never be the same again.
What drives overpays?
Interestingly enough, many overpay packages include current-year picks themselves. This is surprising, since FantasyCalc’s formula is quite forgiving of managers paying hefty prices to move up in the draft. The issue is mainly that people are paying exorbitant prices to move up just a couple spots; for example, somebody in the database offered 3.09 and 3.10 to get to 3.04.
You don’t need to be a statistician to know the odds the player at 3.04 will be that much better than those other picks combined are pretty slim. It seems doubly silly, really when you consider how much of a crapshoot third-rounders are in general (see this article from Reddit user u/NassauBeat for more). The player you’re moving up to acquire basically has to be a blue-chipper who fell way down the board; for example, I jumped up to 3.02 to nab Drake Maye in my 1QB league last year.
Equally compelling is how future picks are often key components of of overpay packages, given how frequently they’re parts of underpays as well. People seem to be recklessly tacking on future picks to deals, running into the same issue found in our previous trade-up. It’s hard to reckon that, outside of exceptional circumstances, this year’s 3.06 is worth both the 3.12 and a future third, for example.
Again, the FantasyCalc algorithm is pretty forgiving of trade-ups in general, which means that the trades it considers overpays must be truly something. It only rates trading a future second and third for 2.09 as a minor overpay, which is pretty surprising. That future picks are still the most common assets in overpay packages thus speaks volumes about how truly egregious those overpays must be.
Summary
Ultimately, the final word on draft-pick trades is the same tired refrain you’ve probably heard before. Even with analytics to guide you, getting an accurate read on one particular player is remarkably hard. This isn’t to say, of course, that you should never trade up, or that you shouldn’t let analytics guide your evaluation process.
Rather, it’s that you shouldn’t be overconfident in your process, even if the math checks out. The best NFL teams, like the Eagles, operate on consensus boards, only moving up to get studs who fell, or when they think there’s a drop-off coming up within a positional group. This is even truer in fantasy, where the tier breaks are more severe than in the actual NFL (refer again to this breakdown for more info).
Being less adamant in your convictions doesn’t just apply to prospects, however; veterans matter, too. If there’s one lesson to learn from our FantasyCalc data, it’s that you shouldn’t indiscriminately flip current-year thirds for middling vets. Rather, the goal should be to flip the third for surplus value in the moment, then use that extra value to snag vets at a discount when needs arise.
Another interesting idea FantasyCalc’s data seems to confirm is just how valuable first-rounders are. To our earlier point, it’s not that there’s anything inherently smart about actually making the pick, given how difficult prospect evaluation is. Rather, you want to hoard first-rounders well ahead of time, in order to get insane offers for those picks come draft time.
Thanks for reading; you can find me on twitter (@capn_cc) or on Bluesky (@capn-collins) if you want real-time insights, and be sure to subscribe so you don’t miss any future posts.